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Substantive Due Process Protection at the Outer
Margins of Municipal Behavior
Brian W. Blaesser*
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of local governments to zone and control land use
is undoubtedly broad. . . . But the zoning power is not infinite
and unchallengeable; it “must be exercised within
constitutional limits.” Accordingly, it is subject to judicial
review; and is most often the case, the standard of review is
determined by the nature of the right assertedly threatened or
violated rather than by the power being exercised or the
specific limitation imposed.
— Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim (1981)1
As originally conceived, zoning was supposed to require very
little exercise of discretion. Rather, it was intended to be a self-
administering land use allocation system, that is, a system of pre-
stated land use classifications and rules under which only cases of
particular hardship would require administrative (variance) or
legislative (zone amendment) action to resolve. A desire to avoid
legislative or administrative interference with the land market drove
this original premise.2 In other words, concern for property rights and
the goal of maximizing the productivity of private actors in the land
market led the founders of zoning to design a “zoning by rules”
system of land use control.
* Partner, Robinson & Cole LLP, Boston, MA.
1. 452 U.S. 61, 67 (1981) (citations omitted).
2. See Jan Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control: Legislative
Preregulation v. Administrative Discretion, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE,
AND ECONOMIC CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 3 (Norman Marcus & Marilyn W. Groves eds.
1970); Douglas W. Kmiec, Deregulating Land Use: An Alternative Free Enterprise
Development System, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 28, 50 (1981).
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Zoning and land use controls have hardly remained faithful to that
original property rights-based concept. In their effort to manage
growth, protect natural resources, preserve community “character,”
provide for infrastructure needs, and secure public amenities, local
governments have gone far beyond the original limited concept of the
variance procedure. Today, they rely heavily upon discretionary
review and approval procedures to address development proposals.
Discretion is nothing more than the exercise of judgment. In the
context of land use and development approvals, discretion means the
substantive and procedural choices made by a legislative or an
administrative body for the purpose for which the power was
delegated.3
Generally, landowners and developers welcome the exercise of
judgment in the implementation of land use and development
controls, provided that the addition of this human ingredient
improves the efficiency and predictability of the decision making
process and promotes pragmatic government flexibility that allows
the developer to respond to the physical constraints of a development
site and changes in the market. Realistically, the landowner and
developer know that the review of a development project in light of
today’s more complex land use, growth, and environmental
considerations requires in many cases the ingredient of human
judgment in order to provide pragmatic resolution of these issues.
There is always a tension between landowners’ and developers’
preferences for certainty on the one hand and on the other hand their
need for pragmatic solutions that only the exercise of judgment can
provide.4
II. DISCRETIONARY DECISIONS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
When discretionary decision making goes awry and judgment is
exercised arbitrarily, there is an abuse of discretion that may amount
to a constitutional violation in the form of substantive due process,
3. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY
INQUIRY (1969).
4. See BRIAN WILLIAM BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS: AVOIDING
INVITATIONS TO ABUSE OF DISCRETION (2000).
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which is actionable under federal law. Substantive due process refers
to the fact that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
imposes both substantive and procedural requirements when it
prohibits any government action that deprives “any person of . . .
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”5 This substantive
component of the Due Process Clause “bars certain arbitrary,
wrongful government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the
procedures used to implement them.’”6 It has been referred to by
some (notably Judge Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit) as a diluted constitutional clause,7 but that view
would appear to be accurate only in the context of a facial attack on a
land use regulation. When a land use regulation is attacked as it is
“applied” to a particular development proposal, substantive due
process should work at full strength.
The right not to be subject to arbitrary or capricious action by a
governmental, legislative, or administrative action is a substantive
due process right. In the face of irrational or wrongful land use
regulatory decisions that may not amount to a taking, landowners and
developers have relied on substantive due process claims in federal
court as an important means to remedy such actions. To their dismay,
however, landowners and developers are learning from federal court
decisions in some of the circuits that, as the degree of discretion that
can be exercised by a government decision making body increases,
the less likely it is that they will be deemed to have any “property
interest” to protect, regardless of how arbitrarily that discretion is
exercised in a particular case. This approach is particularly evident in
the Second, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, which require, as a threshold
step before even reaching the alleged substantive due process
violation, that the plaintiff landowner or developer first prove a
legitimate claim of entitlement to a desired land use or approval so as
to establish a protected property interest in the benefit sought from
the decision making authority.8 Other circuits, notably, the First and
5. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
6. Zinermon v Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1990) (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S.
327, 331 (1986)).
7. Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 464-66 (7th Cir. 1988).
8. See, e.g., Triomphe Investors v. City of Norwood, 49 F.3d 198, 202-03 (6th Cir.
1995); Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 69 (4th Cir. 1992); DLC
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Seventh Circuits, regard land use disputes as political disputes rarely
containing facts sufficient to state a substantive due process claim.9
Only one circuit, the Third Circuit, has concluded that ownership of
property, in and of itself, is a property interest that deserves
substantive due process protection.10 This divergence among the
federal circuits can be attributed in large part to the fact that the U.S.
Supreme Court has never given the lower federal courts adequate
guidance for how to deal with land use cases involving substantive
due process claims of arbitrary and capricious action by local
governments. With local governments increasingly employing
discretionary land use control systems, the decisions of those circuits
that require proof that a protected property interest exist before
proceeding to the alleged substantive due process violation are the
most troubling. This is because the prevailing standard of proof— the
degree of discretion that can be exercised by the decision maker— is
subject to manipulation to defeat legitimate claims of entitlement to a
desired use or a permit approval. Whether such manipulation is
merely the changing of “shall” to “may” in describing the regulator’s
approval authority, creating broad standards under special use or
conditional use procedures, or subjecting all proposed projects to
development “impact” determinations as a condition of approval, the
point has not been lost on municipal attorneys.11
III. PROTECTED PROPERTY INTEREST— THE THRESHOLD INQUIRY
The preoccupation of certain federal circuits with finding a
property interest in substantive due process challenges to land use
regulatory decisions stems from the U.S. Supreme Court’s two 1972
Management Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1998).
9. See, e.g., Nestor Colon Medina & Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 45-46 (1st
Cir. 1992); Coniston Corporation v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.
1988).
10. See DeBlasio v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 53 F.3d 592, 599-600 (3d Cir. 1995)
(relying upon the analysis in Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 1124 (3d Cir. 1988) (footnote and
citation omitted).
11. See, e.g., Hollister and Abare-Brown, Protected Property Interest Analysis: The First
Line of Defense in Due Process Litigation (address at the NIMLO 1990 Annual Conference
(September 23, 1990)).
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non-land use decisions: Band of Regents v. Roth12 and Perry v.
Sindermann.13 Both of these cases addressed the question of whether
there was an interest in employment and the degree of procedural
protection— not substantive due process— that should be accorded
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.14 Roth has
had the most influence on federal court review of substantive due
process challenges to land use decisions.
A. Procedural Due Process Protection
In Roth the Court considered whether a university’s refusal to
renew an untenured professor’s employment contract was a
deprivation of liberty or property under the Fourteenth Amendment.15
Before reaching that question, the Court asked whether the professor
had a constitutionally protected interest in his continued
employment.16 In its analysis the Court recognized that in addition to
property interests arising from ownership of real estate, chattels, or
money, there exists a class of property interests that includes “the
security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific
benefits.”17 However, according to the Court a person’s property
interest in a benefit or entitlement must be based upon more than an
abstract need or desire, or unilateral expectation for such an
entitlement. It must be based upon a “legitimate claim of
entitlement.”18 Hence, the untenured professor whose contract was
not renewed had only a unilateral expectation of continued
employment and no legitimate claim of entitlement.19 Because
Professor Roth did not have a property interest in his continued
12. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
13. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
14. See id.
15. 408 U.S. at 571.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 573, 576. This expanded definition of property interests had been articulated by
the Court two years earlier, in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), in which the Court
extended procedural due process protection to persons whose welfare benefits are terminated.
See id. at 260-61. See also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
18. 408 U.S. at 577.
19. See id. at 571-78.
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employment, he could not claim a violation of procedural due
process.20
B. Substantive Due Process Protection
Since Roth, when asked to consider a substantive due process
challenge to land use regulation, some federal circuits that have been
the most reluctant to become involved in what they consider to be
“local” land use matters, have incorporated Roth’s property interest
inquiry into their analysis in order not to reach the substantive due
process question. If they must reach that question because the facts
demonstrate that the plaintiff has a protected property interest, they
apply a strict, narrow test for substantive due process.
The Second Circuit provides the most emphatic example of this
approach to substantive due process claims. A number of the federal
circuits appear to share its formulation of the Roth entitlement
analysis, or one similar to it, in substantive due process challenges to
land use decisions.21 The Second Circuit’s most significant
entitlement decision is RRI Realty Corp. Inc. v. Village of
Southampton22 for what it reveals about the reasoning and attitude of
many federal courts when presented with substantive due process
challenges to land use decisions. The court in that case commenced
its analysis by noting that its prior decision in a licensing case, Yale
Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson,23 had committed the circuit to an
entitlement test that focused on whether “absent the alleged denial of
due process, there is either a certainty or a very strong likelihood that
the application would have been granted.” 24 Because the Yale Auto
Parts court had found that “the licensing authorities had discretion in
the issuance of the requested permit,” there was no protected property
interest.25 The court then expressed the sentiment that is frequently
20. Id. at 578.
21. See, e.g., Triomphe Investors v. City of Norwood, 49 F.3d 198, 202-03 (6th Cir.
1995); Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 68-69 (4th Cir. 1992); RRI
Realty Corp. Inc. v. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d 911, 917-18 (2d Cir. 1989).
22. 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1989).
23. 758 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1985).
24. 870 F.2d at 917 (quoting Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d Cir.
1985)).
25. 870 F.2d at 917.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol3/iss1/23
p583+Blaesser.doc 01/04/01
2000] Substantive Due Process Protection 589
uttered by federal judges who preside over land use cases:
If federal courts are not to become zoning boards of appeals
(and not to substitute for state courts in their state law review
of local land use regulatory decisions), the entitlement test of
Yale Auto Parts— “certainty or a very strong likelihood” of
issuance— must be applied with considerable rigor.26
At least as defined, the Yale Auto Parts entitlement test appears to
focus upon the likelihood that an application will be granted.
However, the court in RRI Realty stated that its proper application
means that it “must focus primarily on the degree of discretion
enjoyed by the issuing authority, not the estimated probability that
the authority will act favorably in a particular case.”27 The following
chart summarizes the standard as applied by the Second Circuit in
RRI Realty Corp.
As the chart illustrates, as long as the degree of official discretion
is high or deemed by the court to be significant, it always trumps the
probability of permit issuance, whether high or low. The court’s
formulation would not even appear to depend upon whether the
degree of discretion is “high”— only that there is an “opportunity” to
deny: “Even if in a particular case, objective observers would
estimate that the probability of issuance was extremely high, the
opportunity of the local agency to deny issuance suffices to defeat the
existence of a federally protected property interest.”28
Because the Second Circuit’s application of this entitlement test is
independent of the probability of permit approval, it is virtually
impossible to establish a protected property interest so long as the
government decision maker retains discretion or the opportunity to
deny the approval sought. In an era of land use controls that rely upon
discretionary review and decision making mechanisms, the extent to
which other circuits embrace this harsh entitlement test has serious
implications for property owners and developers who seek to
challenge arbitrary decisions by local government.
26. Id. (quoting Yale Auto Parts, Inc. v. Johnson, 758 F.2d 54, 59 (2d. Cir. 1985)).
27. Id. at 918 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
28. Id.
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The acknowledged motivation of the Second Circuit and other
federal circuits not to become federal zoning boards of appeals is the
same motivation that has led the federal courts increasingly to
employ the ripeness and abstention doctrines to either dismiss or stay
constitutional challenges to land use decisions— in effect, leaving the
federal courthouse door only slightly ajar for land use cases that
involve only the most egregious examples of arbitrary action by local
governments.29 The irony of the Second Circuit’s entitlement test is
that while the Second Circuit professes deference to state law as
interpreted by state courts in zoning and land use matters, the Second
29. See, e.g., John J. Delaney & Duane J. Desiderio, Who Will Clean Up the ‘Ripeness
Mess’? A Call for Reform So Takings Plaintiffs Can Enter the Federal Courthouse, 31 URB.
LAW. 195 (1999); Gregory Overstreet, The Ripeness Doctrine of the Taking Clause: A Survey of
Decisions Showing Just How Far Federal Courts Will Go to Avoid Adjudicating Land Use
Cases, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 91 (1994); Brian W. Blaesser, Closing the Federal
Courthouse Door on Property Owners: The Ripeness and Abstention Doctrines in Section 1983
Land Use Cases, 2 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J. 73 (1988).
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Circuit applied the test in RRI Realty Corp. without regard for the
very state and municipal law upon which the state court had relied
and which defined the degree of discretion that the local agency had
to deny the permit. After all, as the U.S. Supreme Court has
explained, property interests are “created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law.”30
In RRI Realty Corp. the plaintiff, RRI, purchased a sixty-three
room mansion on waterfront property and sought a building permit
for extensive renovations to the mansion.31 The building inspector
advised RRI to make one omnibus building permit application when
its plans were finalized.32 In the meantime, he issued a limited
building permit to cover minor structural renovations, and
construction began in early 1981.33 The Zoning Board of Appeals
(ZBA) granted RRI’s application for a height variance.34 In 1983 RRI
submitted its final overall design plan to the Architectural Review
Board (ARB), whose approval was required before the building
inspector could issue the permit.35 After the ARB approved the final
overall design plan, RRI submitted the comprehensive building
permit application, and applied for another height variance from the
ZBA to allow a portion of the structure to exceed the height
limitations of the previously granted variance.36 While the variance
application was pending, the building inspector divided the building
permit application into three stages, with stage one being for the
structural work covered by the initial building permit that had already
been issued and stage two covering the balance of the construction
allowed under the zoning and first variance granted.37 Stage three was
for the portion of the structure for which the pending height variance
was required.38
30. Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980) (quoting
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
31. 870 F.2d 911, 913 (2d Cir 1989).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 870 F.2d at 913.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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At the building inspector’s request, RRI submitted a new set of
more detailed plans for everything but the stage three work.39 The
building inspector referred these plans to the ARB for its approval as
a prerequisite to the issuance of a building permit.40 In the spring of
1984, the building inspector notified RRI that a building permit was
forthcoming.41 However, by then, the mansion renovation had
become controversial among residents.42 Without informing RRI, the
ARB decided to take no action, allowing a mandatory thirty day time
period under the zoning code to expire.43 Then the mayor, reacting to
the residents’ pressure, ordered the building inspector to issue a stop
work order because RRI did not have the building permit for work
past the stage one permit.44 The ZBA denied the stage three variance
request.45
RRI then secured a state court decision, holding that the ARB had
arbitrarily refused to approve the stage two building permit for RRI’s
project because it knew that the stage three permit (requiring the
height variance that had been denied) would violate the existing
regulations.46 This action, the court held, exceeded the ARB’s
jurisdiction, which was limited to matters of aesthetic judgment.47
The state court also found that the village had failed to act within the
requisite time frame of thirty days following receipt of RRI’s
application, and therefore RRI was entitled to the stage-two permit as
a matter of law.48
Subsequently, RRI brought a Section 1983 action49 in federal
district court seeking damages for the delay in the issuance of the
stage two building permit and for attorneys fees and costs.50 The jury
awarded RRI $1.9 million in damages and attorney fees and costs.51
39. Id.
40. 870 F.2d at 913.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 914.
44. Id. at 913.
45. 870 F.2d 913.
46. Id. at 913-14.
47. Id. at 914.
48. Id.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
50. Id.
51. 870 F.2d at 914.
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However, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that, as a matter of
law, there was no property interest in the stage-two permit.52 The
Court’s reasoning is difficult to fathom. Most importantly, if the
court’s approach to determining the existence of a protected property
interest is followed in other circuits, the substantive due process
question will rarely be reached in challenges to land use decisions.
Because the Second Circuit focused upon the degree of discretion
within the power of the regulator, the facts of the case evidencing
probability of permit issuance were virtually irrelevant.53 These facts
were that: (1) ARB had approved RRI’s initial overall design, (2) the
two-stage construction was in full compliance with the zoning law,
(3) there was correspondence between the Building Inspector and
RRI and other discussions to support RRI’s assertion that approval of
the application could be expected, and, most importantly, that (4)
ARB’s time limits within which to act on the application had expired,
causing it to forfeit any discretion it may have had in approving the
permit.54
The court’s reasoning on the expiration of the thirty day time
period to act is particularly baffling. The court essentially dismissed
the significance of the thirty day “deemed approved” provision of the
Village Code, concluding that RRI’s claim to the permit could not be
“fragmented” into two claims¾ one subject to the ARB’s discretion
within thirty days and one subject to a mandatory duty to issue a
permit after thirty days.55 That, however, is precisely what the
Village’s own regulations provided. Incredibly, the court held that
despite the fact that the village’s regulatory provisions divested the
ARB of all discretion after the thirty day period had expired without
action, somehow the ARB’s discretion remained.56
The Second Circuit’s disregard for the state court determinations
of the applicable law is perhaps not surprising in view of the circuit’s
entitlement test. This test, by definition, disregards the probability of
permit issuance. Its approach ignores the U.S. Supreme Court’s
52. Id. at 919.
53. Id. at 918-19.
54. Id.
55. See id. at 919.
56. See id. at 919.
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admonition in Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, quoted at the
beginning of this article, that the standard of review in constitutional
challenges to land use regulations should be “determined by the
nature of the right assertedly threatened or violated rather than by the
power being exercised or the specific limitation being imposed.”57
The Second Circuit’s entitlement test is so rigorous that it invariably
results in courts focusing exclusively on the power (degree of
discretion) being exercised as a matter of law, obviating the need for
courts to consider the nature of the right (substantive due process)
being asserted.
C. Varying Definitions of “Arbitrary” Among the Circuits
The Second Circuit, like other federal circuits that rigorously
apply the Roth entitlement test to determine if a protected property
interest exists, views the substantive due process right as a narrowly
defined right that is rarely triggered by local governmental action.
This action is given great deference whenever some rational basis for
the action can be identified. Accordingly, for these circuits, only
arbitrary action that is extreme in some form merits consideration
under substantive due process. For example, the Sixth Circuit has
adopted the “shocks the conscience” standard for determining when a
local zoning decision violates substantive due process.58 While one
Sixth Circuit panel acknowledged that the terminology is “more apt
for cases involving physical force,”59 another panel observed that “it
is useful in the zoning context too, to emphasize the degree of
arbitrariness required to set aside a zoning decision by a local
authority. . ..”60 The Seventh Circuit defines the level of arbitrariness
required to sustain a substantive due process claim as “invidious or
irrational” governmental action.61 The Eighth Circuit has indicated
that the government action must be “truly irrational,” meaning the
57. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981) (quoting Thomas v
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945)).
58. Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992).
59. Cassady v. Tackett, 938 F.2d 693, 698 (6th Cir. 1991).
60. Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d at 1222.
61. Coniston Corporation v. Village of Hoffman Estates, 844 F.2d 461, 467 (7th Cir.
1988) (citation omitted).
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standard is more stringent than “arbitrary, capricious, or in violation
of state law.”62
Other circuits, notably the First and Ninth, by announcing their
great deference toward local land use decisions whenever there is any
conceivable rational basis, signal by implication that for
governmental land use decisions to be actionable under substantive
due process, the decision must be extremely irrational.63 For example,
the First Circuit has been reluctant to find a substantive due process
violation in a zoning decision even when it involved claims of
malicious obstruction of a landowner’s rights.64 Although the Ninth
Circuit will apply substantive due process analysis to a local zoning
decision involving an individual property owner’s claim, it reviews
such decisions under the highly deferential standard used for
legislation.65
D. Parcel Specific Zoning Decisions— Legislative or Administrative?
One principal reason for the lack of harmony among the federal
circuits on substantive due process is the divergence among the states
themselves on the question of treating a parcel-specific zoning
decision as a legislative versus a quasi-judicial decision. Many state
courts hold that a village board or city council acts in a legislative
capacity when it approves a special use or a planned unit
development— typical discretionary review mechanisms.
Consequently, no precise standards are necessary.66 The village board
or city council is also not bound by the recommendations of its staff
or experts on such matters.67 Unlike legislative decision makers,
administrative bodies must review and draw conclusions from facts
62. Anderson v. Douglas County, 4 F.3d 574, 577 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
63. See, e.g., Dodd v Hood River County, 59 F.3d 852, 864 (9th Cir. 1995); Chesterfield
Dev. Corp. v City of Chesterfield, 963 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1992); Nestor Colon Medina
& Sucesores, Inc. v. Custodio, 964 F.2d 32, 44-45 (1st Cir. 1992).
64. See, e.g., Cloutier v. Town of Epping, 714 F.2d 1184, 1189 (1st Cir. 1983); Creative
Env’ts, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (lst Cir. 1982).
65. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 922 F.2d 498, 507 (9th Cir. 1990).
66. See, e.g., LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake, 325 N.E.2d 105, 110 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975).
67. Minnetonka Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. Svee, 226 N.W.2d 306, 309
(Minn. 1975).
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presented with respect to a specific parcel of property. Under these
procedural due process requirements, which are similar to those
followed in a court of law, their actions are sometimes referred to as
quasi-judicial or adjudicative, that is, judicial-type or adjudicating
actions performed by individuals who are not judges. For example,
courts in Oregon have stated that a decision by a local legislative
body concerning the zoning of an individual parcel is a quasi-judicial
rather than a legislative decision.68 Courts in several other states have
embraced this view.69 However, the majority of states continue to
view parcel specific zoning decisions made by a legislative body as
“legislative.” Consequently, the majority of the federal circuits mirror
this view. Some, such as the Seventh Circuit, even go as far as
characterizing a site plan decision for a single parcel as “legislative,”
which frees the decision maker of making any findings of fact, and
makes the decision, however driven by protectionist or parochial
motives, immune from challenge on substantive due process grounds
so long as there is some relation to land use.70 The First Circuit also
views zoning as a legislative act, such that due process is satisfied
where the decision bears a “conceivable rational relationship” to
“legitimate governmental ends.”71
From a review of the circuits’ discussion of what is meant by
“arbitrary” for purposes of substantive due process claims, it appears
that there are three basic categories. These are:
· Decision is inadequately supported by the record;
· Decision is irrational–no reasonable basis in law; and
· Decision is outside substantive limits of delegated
authority (abuse of discretion).
68. See Fasano v. Board of County Comm’rs of Washington County, 507 P.2d 23, 29
(Ore. 1973), superseded by statute as noted in Menges v. Board of County Comm’rs Jackson
County, 606 P.2d 681, 684-85 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
69. See, e.g., Board of County Comm’rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474-75 (Fla. 1993);
New Castle County. Council v. BC Dev. Assocs., 567 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Del. 1989); Golden v.
City of Overland Park, 584 P.2d 130, 135 (Kan. 1978).
70. New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, 910 F.2d 1474, 1479-80
(7th Cir. 1990).
71. Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1991) (quoting Smithfield
Concerned Citizens for Fair Zoning v. Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir. 1990)) (citations
omitted).
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The following briefly illustrates each of these categories of
arbitrariness.
E. Decision Inadequately Supported by the Record
This form of arbitrariness, which occurs primarily as a result of
quasi-judicial decisions, may not rise to the level of a substantive due
process violation, provided there is truly a rational basis for the
decision. For example, in Sylvia Development Corp. v. Calvert
County, Maryland,72 the plaintiff brought a civil rights action against
the board of county commissioners after a state court had reversed
the board’s denial of the developer’s application for designation of its
property as a “Transfer Zone District” (TZD).73 That designation
would allow the increase in density on a parcel through transfer of
development rights from participating agricultural property owners
under the county’s transferable development rights (TDR) program.74
The state court had found that the board’s decision was
“arbitrary”¾ made without the support of any evidence in the record,
and ordered the board to approve the application.75 In its subsequent
civil rights action in federal court, the developer argued that the state
court’s decision that the board had acted arbitrarily by ordering the
TZD application approved created an entitlement to the TZD zone.76
The Fourth Circuit rejected this reasoning, stating that “a court order
requiring the Board to approve the application does not mean that the
applicant had a preexisting legal right to that approval.”77 In support
of this conclusion, the court quoted from RRI Realty Corp: “The fact
that the permit could have been denied on nonarbitrary grounds
defeats the federal due process claim.”78 However, this statement
begs the question. A violation of substantive due process occurs if the
decision is not, in fact, rational, not that it could have been rational.
72. 48 F.3d 810 (4th Cir. 1995).
73. See id. at 815-17.
74. Id. at 815.
75. Id. at 827 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 826.
77. 48 F.3d at 827.
78. Id. (citing Gardner v. Baltimore Mayor & City Council, 969 F.2d 63, 71 (4th Cir.
1992)) (emphasis added) (quoting RRI Realty Corp. v. Inc. Village of Southampton, 870 F.2d
911, 918 (2d Cir. 1989)).
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The better reasoning, stated elsewhere in the court’s opinion, is that
the decision was, in fact, rational based upon inadequate road access
to accommodate the increased density but not supported by sufficient
evidence in the record.79
F. Irrational Decision— No Reasonable Basis in Law
Even though the Second Circuit’s entitlement test means that it
rarely reaches the step of analyzing the substantive due process
claim, it has found that a decision is arbitrary where it is based upon
an improper motive— in one case involving revocation of a permit
because of “impermissible political animus”80 and in another case
where a town official acted with wrongful motive in imposing
unreasonable conditions upon a permit.81 The Eleventh Circuit has
also found that deprivation of a property interest rises to the level of a
substantive due process violation when done for improper motives. In
one case, for example, the court held that a town’s “reinterpretation”
of a ten year termination date for a residential planned unit
development, contrary to prior written representations upon which
the developer had relied, violated substantive due process.82
G. Decision Outside Substantive Limits of Delegated Authority
The Second Circuit’s decision in RRI Realty Corp. provides the
best example of the category of arbitrary decision making that rises to
the level of a substantive due process violation.83 There, the
Architectural Review Board (ARB) had refused to approve the stage
two building permit for RRI’s project because it knew that the stage
three permit (requiring the height variance that had been denied)
would violate the existing regulations.84 This action, the state court
had held, exceeded the ARB’s jurisdiction, which was limited to
79. Id. at 825.
80. Brady v. Town of Colchester, 863 F.2d 205, 215-16 (2d Cir. 1988).
81. Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162, 167-69 (2d Cir. 1995).
82. Resolution Trust Corporation v. Town of Highland Beach, 18 F.3d 1536, 1549 (11th
Cir. 1994).
83. 870 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1989).
84. Id. at 919-20.
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matters of aesthetic judgment.85 In other words, the ARB had abused
its discretion by acting outside the substantive authority delegated to
it.86 However, because of the Second Circuit’s peculiar entitlement
formulation, it was able to make a “threshold rejection” of the
substantive due process claim despite the clear abuse of discretion
committed by ARB.87
If we examine the circuits’ decisions involving these three
categories of arbitrary government behavior, in my view, as
summarized in the table below, at least two of these categories are
sufficiently wrongful to always constitute a violation of substantive
due process. When the courts have not found these two categories of
government action to violate substantive due process, it is principally
because either they never get past the threshold inquiry of whether
there is a protected property interest, or apply the extremely
deferential rational relationship test appropriate only for truly
“legislative” decisions, which individual zoning decisions arguably
are not. The only category of arbitrariness that, on its face, may
appear not to rise to the level of a substantive due process claim is
when the decision maker fails to support an otherwise rational
decision with adequate evidence in the record.
According to the Second Circuit, such a circumstance is a matter
of state law for the state court to resolve. But if a developer who is
denied the requisite approval based upon a facially reasonable
rationale that is unsupported by the record loses its financing and
ultimately the property as a result, certainly it has incurred damages
as a result of the violation of due process, which is actionable under
42 U.S.C. § 1983. This would seem to be particularly so when the
purported rationale for a denial, such as adequate road access,
however legitimate as a land use matter generally, is not adequately
supported in the record precisely because it is not really an issue—
regardless of how significant neighboring property owners may think
it is. In such instances, a federal circuit, that looks for any
“conceivable rational relationship” to “legitimate government ends,”
85. See RRI Realty Corp. v. Hattrick, 132 A. D. 2d 558, 517 N.Y.S. 2d 284, 285 (1985).
86. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
87. See 870 F.2d at 918.
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such as the First Circuit, is unlikely to find a substantive due process
violation.
ARBITRARY GOVERNMENT ACTION
CATEGORIES OF
ARBITRARINESS
SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
VIOLATION
Decision Inadequately
Supported by Record
Sometimes
Irrational Decision
No Reasonable Basis in
Law
Always
Decision Outside
Delegated Authority
(Abuse of Discretion)
Always
IV. CONCLUSION
When land use regulatory decisions are the result of improper
motives such as personal animus, political bias, or conflicts of
interest, or are the result of judgment being exercised outside the
legal bounds of the authority that was given to the decision maker,
such wrongful governmental action is barred by the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause. Because many local
governments are currently attempting to address increasingly
complex, sometimes subjective issues— preservation of “community
character,” urban design, “cumulative impacts” of land uses, growth
control, environmental protection, affordable housing and
infrastructure needs— through discretionary regulations, there is
significant risk of arbitrary decision making.
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Landowners and developers who seek a substantive due process
remedy for injury resulting from such arbitrary decision making face
an almost insurmountable barrier in those federal circuits that have
erected the protected property interest threshold test in order to avoid
becoming zoning boards of appeal. As recognized by the Third
Circuit, ownership of property should be sufficient to invoke
substantive due process protection from arbitrary government action.
Landowners and developers face an equally difficult hurdle in those
circuits that look for any conceivable rational relationship between a
parcel specific zoning decision and a legitimate governmental
objective— perpetuating the fiction that such decisions are
“legislative” in nature.
As with the confusion among the federal circuits over the
application of the ripeness doctrine in land use disputes, landowners
and developers await clarification from the U.S. Supreme Court to
resolve the confusion among the federal circuits in addressing
substantive due process claims for arbitrary governmental actions.
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